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In this paper, we propose SeGrid, a secure framework for establishing grid keys in low duty cycle sensor networks, for which estab-
lishing a common key for each pair of neighboring sensors is unnecessary since most sensors remain in sleep mode at any instant
of time. SeGrid intends to compute a shared key for two grids that may be multihop away. This design explores the fact that for
most applications, closer grids have higher probability and desire for secure message exchange. SeGrid relies on the availability of
a low-cost public cryptosystem. The query and update of the corresponding public shares are controlled by a novel management
protocol such that the closer the two grids, the shorter the distance to obtain each other’s public share. We instantiate SeGrid based
on Blom’s key establishment to illustrate the computation of a grid key.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Security provisioning is a critical service formany sensor net-
work applications [1–3]. However, the severely constrained
resources (memory, processor, battery, etc.) within a sensor
render many of the popular public key-based security primi-
tives inapplicable [4]. Therefore, much research eﬀort [5–11]
has been placed on how to establish a shared key between two
sensors such that their communications can be secured with
low-cost symmetric encryption techniques.
Most existing schemes [8] for key establishment in sen-
sor networks intend to design light weight (in computational
complexity) algorithms for computing pairwise keys between
neighboring sensors. The induced key-sharing graph con-
taining edges incident at two sensors sharing a common key
should be globally connected in order for the network to
function properly. Another constraint considered by these
techniques is the memory budget allocated for a priori key
information storage. The tradeoﬀ between the consumed
memory space versus the security of the scheme and the
connectivity of the induced key-sharing graph has been well
studied in many of these works.
As understood by the research society, the utmost prob-
lem in a sensor network is the operation time elongation.
Even though the above-mentioned works do take resource
(especially memory space) consumption into consideration,
none of them explores the density dimension for further
energy conservation. In this paper, we propose SeGrid, a
grid-based framework for establishing grid keys in low duty
cycle sensor networks. We envision that all sensors within a
grid are equivalent in routing (as in [12]), and thus a secret
key is needed between two grids (instead of two nodes) that
demand secure communication. In SeGrid, only one or a few
sensors (for fault tolerance) within a grid are active at any in-
stant of time and all other sensors fall asleep for energy con-
servation. This design explores the fact that sensors are low
cost and are densely deployed in a typical network. When a
new sensor becomes active, or an active sensor dies due to en-
ergy depletion, the shared grid keys should be recomputed.
Note that this is diﬀerent than group key construction. If all
sensors within a grid form a group, then SeGrid intends to
compute a shared key between two group leaders, with the
help of all active group members. We instantiate this idea by
applying Blom’s key establishment scheme [13] to demon-
strate the grid key computation. Note that putting redundant
sensors to sleep for energy conservation is a popular method
in topology control [12, 14, 15] and energy-eﬃcient protocol
design [16–18]. However, to the best of our knowledge, this
work is the first to combine energy-eﬃcient topology control
with key establishment.
This research is motivated by the following observations:
two sensors that are closer have higher chance to exchange
message; and it is unnecessary for each pair of sensors to
establish a shared key in low duty cycle sensor networks
[19, 20]. The basic idea of SeGrid is outlined as follows.
We assume that there exists a public cryptosystem with low
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computation cost (e.g., Blom’s key establishment scheme
[13]) such that each sensor can be preloaded with a crypto-
pair containing a public share and a private share before de-
ployment. In SeGrid, sensors compute the grids they are re-
siding in and choose to sleep or wake up based on some
schedule (e.g., the wake-up schedule proposed in [18]). Each
grid has a grid head, an active sensor for message transmis-
sion and public share storage. The grid head stores the pub-
lic shares of all active nodes within its grid at designated lo-
cations and queries the nearest grid that stores the public
shares of another grid based on a novel public share man-
agement protocol. After obtaining the public shares of the
destination grid, the source grid computes a key ks that will
be used to secure all transmissions between these two grids.
The destination grid can follow the same procedure to com-
pute the grid key ks. The public share management protocol
ensures that the closer the two grids are, the shorter the ex-
pected query distance to obtain each other’s public shares is.
This protocol involves only simple algebraic (shift and addi-
tion) operations, thus has very low computation overhead.
We finally instantiate SeGrid based on Blom’s key establish-
ment scheme [13] to demonstrate how the grid key can be
computed based on the underlying public cryptosystem.
The features of SeGrid and the contributions of this pa-
per are summarized as follows.
(i) SeGrid divides sensors into a grid structure and re-
alizes a secure grid communication with only a few
number of nodes being active in each grid. The major-
ity of the sensors fall asleep for energy conservation,
and rely on the associated grid heads for intergrid se-
cure communication. This design is extremely useful
for energy constrained sensor networks. To our best
knowledge, SeGrid is the first work that considers key
establishment and topology control for energy conser-
vation at the same time.
(ii) SeGrid can be easily applied to multihop end-to-end
secure communication. Existing key establishment
schemes rely on intermediary sensors for path key
computation to construct a shared key between two
sensors that are multihop away. Path keys are vul-
nerable because they are exposed to all intermediary
nodes, violating the security requirement that a pair-
wise secret should be known to only the communicat-
ing pairs.
(iii) The required storage space per grid is proportional to
log
√
N , where N is the total number of grids in the
network. This indicates that memory space consumed
by SeGrid grows very slowly with the increase of the
network size.
(iv) The proposed grid-based public share management
scheme explores the communication overhead trade-
oﬀ between queries and updates for public share man-
agement in SeGrid. This design investigates the fact
that in many sensor network applications, two grids
that are farther away have weaker desire to communi-
cate directly.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly
outlines the most related works. Network model and the
underlying assumptions are elaborated in Section 3. We
propose our grid-based framework for establishing grid keys
in sensor networks (SeGrid) in Section 4. The performance
of SeGrid is studied in Section 5. An example instantiation
of SeGrid is sketched in Section 6. We conclude this paper
with a discussion in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
Since the pioneer work of Eschenauer and Gligor [9], many
researchers have been working on how to bootstrap shared
keys for two sensors that desire secure communication. In
this section, we summarize the major related works along the
lines of random key/keying information predistribution and in
situ pairwise key establishment.
The basic random key predistribution scheme is pro-
posed by Eschenauer and Gligor in [9], in which a large key
pool K is computed oﬄine and each sensor picks k keys ran-
domly from K without replacement to form a key ring be-
fore deployment. Two sensors can establish secure commu-
nication as long as they have at least one common key in their
key rings. To enhance the security of the basic scheme, Chan
et al. [6] propose the q-composite keys scheme in which q > 1
number of common keys are required for two nodes to estab-
lish a shared key. To improve scalability, Du et al. [8] employ
the group deployment concept, in which sensors are grouped
before deployment and each group is dropped at one deploy-
ment point. Correspondingly the large key pool K is divided
into subkey spaces, with each associated with one group of
sensors. Subkey spaces overlap if the corresponding deploy-
ment points are adjacent. Such a scheme ensures that close-
by sensors have higher chance to establish a pairwise key di-
rectly. In all these schemes [6, 8, 9], a path key can be estab-
lished for two neighboring sensors that demand secure com-
munication but have no common keys in their key rings. A
drawback of this mechanism is that the path key is exposed to
all intermediary nodes. To overcome this problem, Zhu et al.
[11] propose to break the secret (the shared key) into multi-
ple shares and each share is delivered to the destination along
a diﬀerent logical path. The secret is restored at the destina-
tion when a number of shares are received.
Note that none of the above mentioned random key pre-
distribution schemes guarantees that a key is shared by only
one pair of sensors. Therefore compromising one sensor may
threaten links that are incident to uncompromised nodes.
This problem has been tackled by Chan et al. in [6, 21],
which propose the random pairwise keys scheme. In this
scheme, every node receives a number of unique keys, with
each uniquely shared with another node that is randomly se-
lected [6] or selected based on a virtual grid [21] before de-
ployment. This pairing is done based on node IDs, and there-
fore mutual authentication can be realized after deployment
since all keys are unique and each is associated with a pair of
nodes. A path key can be established with the help of one or
more trusted intermediaries [21]. Combining the concepts of
random pairwise keys and group deployment, the two inde-
pendently proposed but similar key establishment schemes
by Liu et al. [22] and by Zhou et al. [23] have better scalabil-
ity and lower storage overhead.
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To further improve security and scalability, a couple of
random key space predistribution schemes [7, 10] have been
proposed. These two schemes are very similar in nature, ex-
cept that the key spaces are defined diﬀerently. In [7], a key
space is constructed based on Blom’s method [13], and a
shared key between two nodes corresponds to one entry of
a symmetric matrix. In [10], a key space is defined by a sym-
metric bivariate t-degree polynomial [24], and the shared key
of two sensors is the value obtained by plugging the two IDs
into a polynomial. In both schemes, a number of key spaces
are precomputed and each sensor is associated with one or
more key spaces before deployment. Two sensors can com-
pute a pairwise key after deployment if they have keying in-
formation from a common key space.
As claimed by [25], random key and key space predistri-
bution schemes explore the tradeoﬀ of security and mem-
ory consumption, since the amount of preloaded informa-
tion is constrained by thememory budget within each sensor.
A stronger security results in higher memory consumption.
This seems unavoidable in all predistribution schemes, due
to the randomness since no sensor network topology infor-
mation is available before deployment.
iPAK [26] and SBK [27], two truely in situ key establish-
ment schemes that remove the randomness, achieve good
security with a small amount of memory consumption. In
iPAK and SBK, a number of service sensors are sacrifices
and therefore worker sensors do not need any predeployment
knowledge for pairwise key establishment. In iPAK, service
sensors, with each carrying a key space, and worker sensors,
with no a priori knowledge, are deployed at the same time.
In SBK, homogeneous sensors are preloaded with several sys-
tem parameters and they diﬀerentiate their roles as either ser-
vice nodes or worker nodes after deployment. A key space is
constructed after the role of a service node is determined.
In both schemes, worker sensors obtain security information
through an asymmetric secure channel from service nodes
and then compute shared keys with their neighbors. Each
service node has a λ-secure key space, and distributes keying
information to at most λ worker sensors through an asym-
metric secure channel established by Rabin’s algorithm [28].
Compared to iPAK, SBK is “perfect” against node capture at-
tack, achieves high connectivity (close to 1) in the induced
key-sharing graph, and consumes a small amount of mem-
ory in worker sensors.
SeGrid is diﬀerent from all thosementioned above in that
secure communication is realized based on the shared keys
between two grids instead of two sensors. SeGrid divides the
sensor network into a virtual grid structure based on loca-
tion information, and computes a location-aware grid key
between any two grids. Only one or a few number of sen-
sors are active at any instant of time in each grid, with one
of them as the grid head. All the intergrid communications
must be directed through the associated grid heads. SeGrid
is able to provide multihop end-to-end secure communica-
tion, and thus does not require the establishment of a path
key. SeGrid considers topology control for energy conserva-
tion and key establishment at the same time, a practical so-
lution for network lifetime elongation. In SeGrid, memory
consumption grows very slowly when the size of the network
increases fast (proportional to log
√
N); therefore, SeGrid has
good scalability.
3. NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a sensor network deployed in outdoor environ-
ments. Each sensor is able to position itself through any of
the techniques proposed in literature (e.g., [29–31]). A vir-
tual grid will be computed based on position information
and each sensor resides in one grid. The ID of a grid is de-
noted by (X ,Y). At any instant of time, one or t > 1 number
of sensors, where t is a small integer, are active within a grid
and all other sensors fall asleep for energy conservation. A
sleeping sensor wakes up periodically in order to replace a
sensor with depleted energy. An active sensor is in full oper-
ation and all active sensors collaborate together to guarantee
the functioning of the network. Sensors within neighboring
grids can communicate directly. The wake-up/sleep schedule,
the active/inactive status transition, and the underlying rout-
ing protocol for message dissemination are out of the scope
of this paper. We just simply assume that they are available
for us to employ. Existing works that are related to these top-
ics can be found in [18, 32], and so forth.
We will explore a public cryptosystem that contains pub-
lic and private crypto-pairs. The public share in a crypto-pair
can be disseminated to the public as plain text while its cor-
responding private share must be kept secret. By exchang-
ing their public shares, two nodes can compute a shared
key based on their private shares and the exchanged public
shares. Examples of cryptosystems satisfying these conditions
include the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange protocol [33], the
symmetric matrix-based key establishment scheme [13], and
the polynomial-based scheme [24]. In Section 6, we are go-
ing to instantiate SeGrid based on Blom’s method.
We assume each sensor is preloaded with a crypto-pair
before deployment. The operation of the sensor network is
unattended after deployment. Each grid may have more than
one public share, if it has more than one active sensor. An
update message will be directed to all locations storing the
public shares of the grid such that the public shares of newly
introduced active (old inactive) sensors can be inserted (re-
moved). A grid demanding the public shares of another grid
can just query the nearest grid storing the corresponding in-
formation.Wewill propose a simple protocol for public share
management in Section 4.2.
We envision that in a sensor network all nodes within a
grid are equivalent. Therefore we only consider the secure
communication between two grids. The computation of the
shared key ks between the two grids depends on the under-
lying public cryptosystem. We will show how to compute
ks based on Blom’s key establishment scheme in Section 6.
Note that intragrid secure communications are needed when
more than one sensor is active simultaneously within a grid.
The shared keys between these active nodes can be computed
based on the underlying public cryptosystem too.
Note that even though t > 1 number of sensors may be
active at any instant of time, we assume that only one sensor
4 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
within a grid is in charge of all intergrid communications
and public share storage. This sensor is the grid head. In
other words, the grid head stores all public shares for the
associated grid. Note that a grid head will be replaced by a
new one when its energy is depleted. This procedure is out
of the scope of this paper too. Existing works that cover the
role transition of grid heads can be found in [12, 16]. The
new grid inherits all stored public shares from the old one
for the associated grid.
4. SEGRID: THE GRID-BASED FRAMEWORK
FOR KEY ESTABLISHMENT
In this section, we propose the basic idea of SeGrid, a grid-
based framework for key establishment in sensor networks.
Note that this elaboration does not depend on any public
cryptosystem. We will instantiate this idea in Section 6 based
on Blom’s key establishment scheme [13].
In SeGrid, each sensor computes the associated grid ID
locally and independently based on its position information
according to the grid and grid head determination scheme.
Therefore all sensors are partitioned based on a virtual grid
structure after deployment. All active nodes within a grid
store their public shares at designated locations (grids) de-
termined by the public share management scheme. When two
grids need to set up their shared key, each grid first figures out
the nearby location from which to query the public shares
of the other grid, and then applies the grid key computa-
tion technique. After a secret is computed, two grids can se-
curely communicate with each other to protect all message
exchange.
SeGrid considers both key establishment and network
lifetime extension through topology control simultaneously.
With only one or a few number of active nodes in each grid,
the majority of the sensors can sleep most of the time and
rely on the associated grid heads for grid-to-grid communi-
cation. The novel public share management scheme ensures
that two grids get the public shares of each other from a posi-
tion within a short distance. A shared key between two grids
can be further secured with the location information.
In the following, we will first describe a simple algorithm
for each sensor to locally and independently compute the ID
of the grid in which it resides. Then we give a novel proto-
col for each grid to determine where to store its own pub-
lic shares, and also where to obtain the public shares of the
other communicating grid to establish a shared grid key. In
the last, we propose how to apply SeGrid for protecting the
unicast communications between two grids.
4.1. Grid and grid head determination
In GAF [12], the size of a grid is determined based on node
equivalence for routing. In other words, any node within a
grid can communicate directly with any other node in any
neighboring grid. This constraint specifies that the size of a
grid, denoted by r, can be at most R/
√
5, where R is the nomi-
nal transmission range. In our study, we adopt this idea since
we also intend to turn oﬀ most of the sensors within a grid
for energy conservation in order to extend network lifetime.
GAF specifies the length of the grid edge but does not specify
how to determine the grid a node resides in. In the follow-
ing, we propose a very simple algorithm to allow each node
independently and locally determine its grid.
Assume a sensor S is deployed at position (x, y). Then the
grid ID (X ,Y) where S resides in can be derived as
X = x ÷ 2log2 r,
Y = y ÷ 2log2 r. (1)
Note that the grid ID (X ,Y) can be computed through shift
operations only, as long as log2 r is computed oﬄine and
uploaded into each sensor before deployment. This is a rea-
sonable assumption since r depends only on the nominal
transmission range R, which can be made available before
deployment. Therefore we can simply shift the binary rep-
resentations of x and y to the right for k positions, where
k = log2 r, to obtain X and Y .
If only one active sensor is required within a grid, the
protocol proposed in [12] for active node selection suﬃces.
In this case, the unique active sensor serves as the grid head.
When t > 1 active sensors per grid are required, these nodes
can be elected based on node ID, or residual power. For ex-
ample, a simple protocol may require that the t sensors with
the smallest t IDs in a grid whose residual powers are above
some threshold remain active while others go to sleep after
the grid ID of each sensor is computed and broadcasted. In
this case, we can choose the sensor with minimum ID as the
grid head. Requiring more than one active sensor per grid
provides better fault tolerance since the grid head is in charge
of both message dissemination and keying information stor-
age. When a grid head needs to be replaced due to reasons
such as power depletion, it can delegate another active sen-
sor as the new grid head and transfer all stored public shares
before turning to sleep mode. If no active sensor within the
same grid is available, the grid head should wait until a sleep-
ing sensor wakes up. A similar procedure for grid head role
transition has been proposed in [12].
4.2. Public share management
As stated before, each grid needs to store the public shares
of all its active nodes at designated positions (grids) for the
convenience of being queried by other grids to establish in-
tergrid shared keys. To solve this problem, we need to an-
swer two questions. First, for any grid (X0,Y0), where shall
we store its public shares? Second, if grid (X1,Y1) would like
to securely communicate with (X0,Y0), where to find out the
latter’s public shares? We propose a simple protocol for stor-
ing and querying the public shares of a grid.
Our protocol is based on the following assumption: the
closer the two grids are, the higher the probability they may
communicate is. Therefore, the public shares of a grid will
be stored at designated locations such that the closer the lo-
cation is to the grid, the shorter the expected query distance
involved in public share acquisition is. In our protocol, the
density of the grids storing the public shares of a grid drops
logarithmically as the distance to the grid increases. Figure 1
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Figure 1: The public shares of the grid (4, 4) will be stored at (4, 4),
(3, 4), (4, 3), (4, 5), (5, 4), (3, 3), (5, 5), (3, 5), (5, 3), (1, 1), (3, 1),
(4, 1), (5, 1), (7, 1), (1, 3), (7, 3), (1, 4), (7, 4), (1, 5), (7, 5), (1, 7),
(7, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7), (5, 7), (1, 11), (4, 11), (7, 11), (11, 11), (11, 7),
(11, 4), (11, 1). If the grid (8, 9) needs the public shares of (4, 4), it
can query either (7, 7) or (7, 11) since they are closer.
gives a simple example to illustrate the storage locations of
the public shares for the grid (4,4).
The answer to the first question is very simple. The public
shares of the grid (X0,Y0) will be stored at the grid (X ,Y)
where
x = X0,
Y = Y0 ±
(
2i+1 − 1), for i = 0, 1, . . . ,
(2)
or
X = X0 ±
(

























for i = 0, 1, . . . .
(4)
To identify the nearest grid that stores the public shares





















Note that the grids formed by
X = X0 + sign
(
X1 − X0
)× (2ix − 1),
Y = Y0 + sign
(
Y1 − Y0
)× (2iy − 1),
(6)





1 if x ≥ 0,
−1 if x < 0,
(7)
and |ix − iy| ≤ 1 if ix 	= 0 and iy 	= 0, store the public shares
of (X0,Y0). Therefore (X1,Y1) can choose the nearest one to
query the public shares of (X0,Y0). An example is given in
Figure 1 when grid (8, 9) queries the public shares of (4, 4).
Based on (5), i−x = 2, i+x = 3, i−y = 2, and i+y = 3. The nearest
grids storing (4, 4)’s public shares are either (7, 7) or (7, 11)
since they are the closest among the 4 grids formed by X =
4 + 3, X = 4 + 7, Y = 4 + 3, and Y = 4 + 7.
As shown by (2)–(4), the computation of the storage lo-
cations for a grid contains only shift and addition opera-
tions. However, the identification of the nearest grid for pub-
lic share query (see (5)) involves the complicated log func-
tions. Nevertheless, this can be done easily through a lookup
table. Hence, each grid can easily determine where to store
and query the public shares.
Note that if Manhattan distance instead of Euclidean dis-
tance is used as a routing metric for public share queries
and updates, the computation overhead is further decreased
since only simple addition and subtraction operations are in-
volved.
Remarks 1. (i) This protocol guarantees that closer grids ob-
tain the public shares within shorter distance. Therefore, the
farther away the two grids are, the higher the communication
overhead for their public share queries is. In reality, closer
grids intend to communicate with higher probability.
(ii) The update of the public shares for a grid always takes
the same number of messages, as long as the routing protocol
remains unchanged.
(iii) The grid head will store all public shares for other
grids based on (2)–(4). Before turning to sleepmode, the grid
head should transfer all stored information to the new grid
head.
4.3. Grid key computation
In SeGrid, two communicating grids need to establish a
shared key computed by obtaining the public shares of each
other. The computation of the grid key can be further se-
cured with the grid location information. However, the de-
tailed computation procedure depends on the underlying
public cryptosystem. In Section 6, we will show how to com-
pute the shared key between two grids based on Blom’s key
establishment scheme [13].
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4.4. Secure grid communication
Nowwe are ready to propose our secure grid communication
scheme. We assume there exists a routing protocol, either
geography-based (e.g., [34]) or topology-based (e.g., [32]),
such that we can employ directly.
Recall that SeGrid is built upon a public cryptosystem
that contains public and private crypto-pairs. By exchanging
their public shares, two sensors can establish a shared secret
based on the private shares and the exchanged public shares.
Therefore two nodes within the same grid can communicate
securely with each other. However, intergrid secure commu-
nications must seek the help of the grid heads, as illustrated
by the following procedure.
(1) Each active sensor first establishes a secure intragrid
communication link with the associated grid head.
The nodes exchange their public shares, and compute
the shared key with their private shares.
(2) The two corresponding grid heads are responsible for
the secure intergrid communication. Each grid head
first queries the nearest grid that contains the public
shares of the other party based on the procedure pro-
posed in Section 4.2 to obtain the public shares, then
computes a secret key ks shared by these two grids. ks
will be used to secure all the future communications
between the two grids.
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the performance of SeGrid in terms
of memory overhead, communication cost, and resilience
against node capture attack. Note that in SeGrid, only a few
number of sensors are active in each grid at any instant of
time, and are involved in grid key computation. Let S denote
the sensor network under consideration and let N be the to-
tal number of grids in S. For simplicity we assume that all
grids form a square region, and each grid has an edge length
of “1” unit.
5.1. Storage overhead
In the proposed SeGrid framework, the public shares of each
grid need to be stored at designated grids for the convenience
of being queried by other grids to establish shared grid keys.
In this subsection, we study the storage overhead, that is, the
maximum number of public shares a grid head may store
for other grids. To simplify the analysis, we assume each grid
has only one active sensor, the grid head. Therefore each grid
stores at most one public share for another grid. Let τ be the
maximum number of public shares a grid stores in a sensor
network S.
Lemma 1. When N = 22k − 2k+1 + 1, where k = 1, 2, . . . , the
grid in the center stores τ public shares in the network. Further,
τ = 1 for k = 1, and τ = 16k − 23 for k > 1.
Proof (Induction). When k = 1, only one grid exists. It is







2m−1 2m − 1 2m−1
2m+1 − 1
Figure 2: A is the central grid and stores the maximum number of
public shares in S. When S is enlarged into S′ and N is increased
from 22m − 2m+1 + 1 to 22(m+1) − 2m+2 + 1, A’s public shares stored in
S′ are still the maximum.
the center grid stores a copy for each of the other 8 grids,
while a boundary grid stores less based on the public share
management protocol. Therefore the lemma holds true since
16× 2− 23 = 9.
Assume the argument holds true until k = m. Now con-
sider k = m+1. The network is enlarged from S with an edge
length of 2m−1 to S′ with an edge length of 2m+1−1. LetA be
the central grid of both S and S′, then A stores the maximum
number of public shares in S. For contradiction, we assume
that another grid B other than A stores the maximum num-
ber of public shares in S′.
For grid A, the public shares stored in S′ come from two
sources: the public shares A stores in the 16m− 23 grids of S
from the assumption, and the public shares in the newly en-
larged area. According to (2)–(4), 16 public shares are added
to the area defined by S′ −S, (2)–(4) show that 16 more grids
are included wheneverm is increased by 1 for allm > 1. Thus,
A stores 16(m + 1)− 23 copies of public shares in S′.
The public shares stored at B come from two sources too.
As indicated by Figure 2, B stores at most 16m − 23 num-
ber of public shares within the area S1 whose edge length is
2m − 1, since S1 overlap with S′. B also stores public shares
from the area S′1 − S1, where S′1 is centered at B. According
to (2)–(4), this area contains less than 16 public shares of B.
Therefore the total number of B’s public shares in S′ is less
than (16m − 23) + 16, that is, 16(m + 1) − 23. This contra-
dicts with the previous assumption. Thus, B cannot store the
maximum number of public shares in the enlarged network
S′.
Corollary 1. When 22(k−1)−2k+1 < N < 22k−2k+1+1, where
k = 2, 3, . . . , then the maximum number of public shares stored
by a grid in the network is at most 16k − 23.
Proof. This corollary holds true from Lemma 1 and (2)–(4).
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Based on Lemma 1 and Corollary 1, we obtain the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 1. Let N be the total number of grids in a network
following the proposed public share management scheme, where
N > 9. Then the number of public shares stored at each grid is
at most 16× log2(
√
N + 1) − 23.
Proof. For anyN > 9, there exists an integer k satisfying k > 1
such that
22(k−1) − 2k + 1 < N ≤ 22k − 2k+1 + 1,
that is, 2k−1 − 1 <
√
N ≤ 2k − 1,
that is, k − 1 < log2 (
√
N + 1) ≤ k.
(8)
Therefore k = log2 (
√
N + 1). According to Lemma 1 and
Corollary 1, each grid stores at most 16k − 23 public shares
in the network, which means that the maximum storage per
grid is at most 16× log2(
√
N + 1) − 23.
Theorem 2. For a network following the public share manage-
ment scheme, the number of public shares stored at a grid A is
equal to the total number of A’s public share stored within the
network.
Proof. Let (X ,Y) be a grid that stores the public share of the
grid (X0,Y0) in the network. Assume X 	= X0 and/or Y 	= Y0.



























X ∓ (2i − 1),





Y ∓ (2i − 1),
Y ∓ (2i+1 − 1),
(10)
Hence for any grid B, B stores A’s public share if and only if
A stores B’s public share. From (2) and (3), it is easy to argue
that the same relationship holds true for the cases of X = X0
and/or Y = Y0.
According to Theorems 1 and 2, the storage overhead re-
quired in each grid is at most 16×log2(
√
N+1)−23, where
N > 9. This indicates that in the worst case, storage overhead
increases very slowly when N grows fast. Figure 3 plots the
average number of public shares stored at each grid obtained
from simulation study as well as the previously computed
theoretical upper bound. Both trends imply that the storage
in each grid grows slowly as the number of grids increases.






















Figure 3: The memory storage for public shares at each grid.
5.2. Communication overhead
In SeGrid, public shares of each grid need to be stored at des-
ignated locations at the system initialization phase and to be
updated later when sensors change state. Further, querying
public shares of another grid also involves message transmis-
sion.
Storing public shares of each grid during the initializa-
tion phase contributes the most to the communication over-
head, since each grid needs to store a copy of its public
shares in every designated position according to the public
share management scheme. Nevertheless, public shares can
be transmitted just in plain texts, and can be very small (e.g.,
as implemented by [7], only the seed of the public share
needs to be exchanged). On the other hand, SeGrid explores
the communication overhead tradeoﬀ between public share
queries and updates. An update happens only when there is
an active membership change, and this update may travel
long distance. However, query overhead can be decreased
since no global flooding will be involved. For a system with
frequent public share acquisition request, the proposed pub-
lic share management protocol is eﬃcient in energy conser-
vation.
5.3. Resilience against node capture
SeGrid relies on the availability of the underlying public
cryptosystem for shared key computation between two sen-
sors in the network. By compromising a number of sensors,
an attacker may obtain the grid key and conduct further at-
tacks. The security of SeGrid is dependent on the underlying
public cryptosystem.
For example, the security of the grid key computa-
tion method proposed in Section 6.2 is constrained by the
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λ-security of the Blom’s key establishment system. Once
more than λ number of sensors are compromised, the whole
system becomes insecure. Increasing λ does improve secu-
rity, but this requires a larger amount of memory. A possible
strategy to overcome this problem is to hierarchically apply
multiple key spaces. We target this as a future research.
6. A SIMPLE REALIZATION
In this section, we provide a simple realization of SeGrid for
sensor networks based on Blom’s key establishment scheme
[13]. For completeness, we give a brief overview on Blom’s
scheme first. Then we describe how to compute a grid key
based on Blom’s scheme. Finally, we propose a location-
aware grid key computation as an enhancement.
6.1. Preliminary: Blom’s key management scheme
Blom’s λ-secure key establishment scheme [13] has been well
tailored for light-weight sensor networks by [7]. In the fol-
lowing, we will give an overview on Blom’s scheme based on
[7].
Let G be a (λ + 1) ×M matrix over a finite field GF(q),
where q is a large prime. The connotation of M will be-
come clear later.G is public, with each column called a public
share. Let D be any random (λ + 1)× (λ + 1) symmetric ma-
trix. D must be kept private, which is known to the network
service provider only. The transpose ofD ·G is denoted by A.
That is, A = (D ·G)T . A is private too, with each row called a
private share. Since D is symmetric, A · G is symmetric too.
If we let K = (ki j) = A · G, we have ki j = kji, where ki j is
the element at the ith row and the jth column of matrix K ,
i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,M.
The basic idea of Blom’s scheme is to use ki j as the se-
cret key shared by node i and node j. D and G jointly define
a key space (D,G). Any public share in G has a unique pri-
vate share in A, which form the so-called crypto-pair. For
example, the ith column of G, and the ith row of A form
a crypto-pair and the unique private share of the ith col-
umn of G, a public share, is the ith row of A. Two sensors
whose crypto-pairs are obtained from the same key space can
compute a shared key after exchanging their public shares.
From this analysis, it is clear thatM is the number of sensors
that can compute their pairwise keys based on the same key
space.
In summary, Blom’s scheme states the following protocol
for nodes i and j to compute ki j and kji, based on the same
key space.
(i) Each node stores a unique crypto-pair. Without loss
of generality, we assume node i gets the ith column of
G and the ith row of A, denoted by gki and aik, where
k = 1, 2, . . . , λ + 1, respectively. Similarly, node j gets
the jth column of G and the jth row of A, denoted by
gk j and ajk, where k = 1, 2, . . . , λ + 1, respectively.
(ii) Node i and node j exchange their stored public shares
drawn from their crypto-pairs as plain texts.




aik · gk j . (11)




ajk · gki. (12)
Blom’s key establishment scheme ensures the so-called λ-
secure property, which means that the network should be
perfectly secure as long as no more than λ nodes are com-
promised. This requires that any λ+ 1 columns of Gmust be
linearly independent. An interesting method of computing
G is proposed by Du et al. in [7]. This idea is sketched as the
following. Let len be the number of bits in the symmetric key
to be computed. Choose q as the smallest prime that is larger
















1 1 1 · · · 1
































Note that G is a Vandermonde matrix. Each column of G
represents the public share of some sensor node storing that
column. In Blom’s key establishment scheme, public shares
need to be exchanged between sensors that require secure
peer-to-peer communication. Based on the structure of G,
we observe that only the second element of each column, the
seed of the column, needs to be stored and exchanged. Thus
both storage and communication overheads can be greatly
decreased.
6.2. Grid key computation based on Blom’s method
Assume that a large key space (D,G) following Blom’s key es-
tablishment scheme has been computed oﬄine. Before de-
ployment, each sensor receives a crypto-pair from the key
space. Note that we do not require the crypto-pairs to diﬀer-
ent sensors to be unique, but we require that all active sen-
sors within one grid have diﬀerent crypto-pairs. It is possible
that more than one active node exists in each grid, thus the
key shared by two grids may be computed based on multiple
public shares.
Let tA(tB) be the number of active sensors in a grid
(XA,YA)((XB,YB)). Following the public share management
protocol proposed in Section 4.2, all these tA(tB) public
shares will be stored at designated grids, and are available
to other grids upon a request. If (XA,YA) and (XB,YB) need
secure communication, the grid head of (XA,YA) computes
and queries the nearest grid holding (XB,YB)’s public shares,
and distributes them to all the active nodes in the grid












Grid (XA,YA) Grid (XB ,YB)
Hash to obtain Ks
Figure 4: There exist three active sensors in grid (XA,YA) and
two active sensors in grid (XB ,YB). The two nodes labeled by 1A
and 1B are the grid heads in the corresponding grids. After ob-
taining the public shares of (XB ,YB), nodes 1A, 2A, and 3A in grid
(XA,YA) compute k11 and k12, k21 and k22, and k31 and k32, the
shared keys with the two nodes in grid (XB ,YB) independently.
Then each node iA within (XA,YA) computes kiA = Hash(ki1, ki2)
for i = 1, 2, 3. This value will be securely transmitted to node 1A.
After obtaining all kiA ’s, where i = 1, 2, 3, node 1A computes ks as
ks = Hash(k1A , k2A , k3A ). Similarly, node 1B in grid (XB ,YB) com-
putes ks based on the public shares of (XA,YA).
(XA,YA). The grid head of (XB,YB) conducts the same pro-
cedure.
Now the grid key shared by (XA,YA) and (XB,YB) is ready
to be computed independently in each grid based on the ex-
changed public shares. In Blom’s key establishment scheme,
two sensors can compute a shared key as long as they know
each other’s public share. We can derive a shared key ks be-
tween two grids from the keys shared by all pairs of sensors
within the two grids, as shown in Figure 4.
Let us use grid (XA,YA) as an example to demonstrate the
procedure of computing a shared key with the grid (XB,YB).
After obtaining the public shares of grid (XB,YB) (consisted
of the public shares from nodes 1B and 2B), each node i in
(XA,YA) computes a shared key with each node j in grid
(XB,YB). These pairwise keys are denoted by ki j , where i =
1, 2, . . . , tA and j = 1, 2, . . . , tB. Then each node i computes
ki = Hash(ki1, . . . , kitB ). This value is securely transmitted to
the grid head h of (XA,YA) based on the shared key between
nodes i and h. After receiving all ki’s, where i = 1, 2, . . . , tA,
h derives the grid key ks by computing Hash(k1, k2, . . . , ktA).
The same procedure is conducted at the grid (XB,YB). Note
that the hash function exploited must be linear, and must
be able to take arbitrary number of inputs. The simple XOR
function is an example.
All aﬀected grid keys must be reestablished whenever a
new sensor becomes active or an old sensor dies due to en-
ergy depletion. Note that only the public shares of the node
with role change needs to be updated (inserted or removed
from designated grids).
Remarks 2. (i) The private shares of each sensor must be kept
secret.
(ii) The security of the grid key computation proto-
col based on Blom’s key establishment scheme [13] is de-
termined by the λ-secure property of the key space (D,G).
Therefore if the crypto-pairs of more than λ sensors are
exposed to the adversary, the security of the whole network is
compromised. This is themajor drawback of applying Blom’s
key establishment scheme for grid key computation since
the memory budget within a sensor for security information
storage is limited.
(iii) The space consumed for storing the crypto-pairs
within a sensor is related to λ. The larger the λ is, the higher
the security level is, and the larger the storage space is.
(iv) The computation overhead of a grid key is deter-
mined by λ too. Each shared key computation between two
active nodes takes λ + 1 number of modular multiplications.
6.3. Location-aware grid key enhancement
For the purpose of secure grid communication, the grid
keys are desired to be unique. However, sensors may receive
the same crypto-pairs in our realization based on Blom’s
method. Therefore two pairs of grids may have the same grid
key.
Let G1 and G2 be two grids that compute a secure grid
key ks(G1,G2). Assume there are altogether n(≥ 2) active
nodes in these two grids. Let c1, . . . , cn denote the crypto-
pairs associated with these n active nodes. Let G′1 and G
′
2
be another pair of grids containing n active nodes. The grid
key ks(G′1,G
′
2) is to be computed based on the associated
crypto-pairs c′1, . . . , c′n. With the Blom’s grid key computa-
tion scheme, the probability that the two pairs of grids derive
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whereM is the total number of crypto-pairs in the key space.
Figure 5 plots the probability that two pairs of grids com-
pute the same grid key. We observe that a larger M or a
larger n results in a lower probability. However, a larger n
may shorten the network lifetime. In the following, we pro-
pose to apply grid position information for unique grid key
derivation.
Assume that gridG1 wants to compute its shared key with
grid G2. After G1’s grid head h has collected the confidential
contributions k1, k2, . . . , kt from all the active nodes within
G1, h computes the grid key as
Hash(k1, k2, . . . , kt,X1,Y1,X2,Y2), (15)
where (X1,Y1)((X2,Y2)) is the grid ID of G1 (G2) computed
from (1).
This position-aware grid key computation eliminates the
ambiguity existing in the original grid key computation
scheme based on Blom’s method. By applying the unique ID
of each grid, every pair of two grids can compute a unique
shared key.
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Figure 5: The probability that two pairs of grids obtain the same
grid key.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, we have proposed SeGrid, a grid-based key es-
tablishment framework for sensor networks. We have instan-
tiated SeGrid based on Blom’s key establishment scheme to
demonstrate how to compute a grid key shared by two grids.
To our best knowledge, SeGrid is the first work that targets
key establishment and energy conservation simultaneously.
This is a more practical consideration since sensors may stay
in sleep mode most of the time for network lifetime exten-
sion. We will explore new instantiation ideas for better secu-
rity provisioning.
As another future research we will explore the applicabil-
ity of ID-based cryptosystems [35] to SeGrid. In an ID-based
encryption system, the public key can be any string (e.g., an
email address), and the private key needs to be computed
from the public key and other system parameters. The idea
of using the grid ID as a public key in SeGrid is very attrac-
tive since public key management can be totally avoided.
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